moral domains is concerned with caring for or harming other people (Hofmann, Wisneski, explicit motive (Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008) . We propose that situations which allow 93 people to have impact on others (e.g., the moral decision of harming someone, or, McClelland et al., 1989) -for example the decision as to whether someone wants to pursue a 105 power profession (Jackson, 1974) .
106
In this study we investigated the relationship between the explicit power motive and 107 moral decision making using hypothetical moral dilemmas. We focused on the explicit power 108 motive since we were asking for a conscious decision of whether or not something was morally acceptable, which is more likely to be influenced by the explicit rather than the 110 implicit power motive (McClelland et al., 1989) . Importantly, the explicit power motive can 111 be divided into two components: hope to gain power (h_Power) and fear to lose power 112 (f_Power). Notably, h_Power and BAS are conceptually similar; both are related to a 113 sensitivity to gaining a positive outcome. However, whereas BAS is generally related to any 114 positive outcome, h_Power is related to the specific positive outcome of gaining influence 115 over other people. Similarly f_Power is somewhat similar to BIS but related to a sensitivity of 116 avoiding the specific negative outcome of losing influence on other people (Elliot, & Thrash, 117 2002; Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012; see Table 2 for correlations).
118
We propose that choosing the utilitarian option is preferred by individuals with a 119 higher h_Power, as by killing one person to save multiple others they actively gain influence 120 on other people. Arguably, by not acting many persons and their lives are also strongly affected; 121 however, in this case it is not the power motivated person themselves who actively exerts influence on 122 other people but the properties of the situation (e.g., the runaway trolley). Thus, this decision should 123 not be as appealing to power motivated people. Moreover, as the positive outcome of saving multiple others seems to be more specific to h_Power than to BAS, we hypothesise h_Power 
Procedure

170
Participants gave informed consent and completed the BIS-BAS and UMS scales.
171
Afterward, the experimenter instructed the participants to assume that the two dilemma 172 options were the only possible resolutions for each situation and not to concern themselves 173 with either the legality of the proposed actions nor whether they could actually act in such a 174 manner themselves; instead, they were to focus only on whether or not the action/resolution 175 was morally acceptable. Then, the participants answered two practice dilemmas before the 176 main task. All stimuli were presented on a 17 inch computer screen using methods identical where the judgement was indicated by either pressing "A" or "L" on a standard keyboard.
181
The computer recorded response times (RT) and responses. 
Results
184
Analytical Approach
We employed generalised linear mixed effects models (GLMM) with a logistic link 186 function (see Table 3 ) using the glmer function in R's (version 3. personality variables were standardised and showed no strong correlations (see Table 2 ). substantially unchanged across all models tested (see Table 3 ). Most importantly, if a person 227 had an h_Power score 1 SD below or above the population mean the baseline probability 228 changed to 53% or 65%, respectively (β = .27, p = .037). Thus, h_Power was indeed 229 positively related to the probability of choosing the utilitarian option in these moral 230 dilemmas. Notably, in a model that included both h_Power and BAS (model 2), h_Power was 231 only marginally significant, β = .22, p = .096, whereas BAS was not significant, β = .16, p =
202
232
.200. This indicates that some of the variance h_Power and BAS share was predictive of 233 utilitarian choices but that h_Power was the overall stronger predictor. 
234
Exploratory analysis
240
To explore whether the five personality variables (see Table 2 Table 5 and Figure   245 1), which included both interactions, shows that an average person, with average h_Power 246 and BIS scores, across all dilemmas had a 59% baseline probability, β = 0.37, p = .202, of 247 picking the utilitarian option. In self-beneficial dilemmas, this probability changed to 51% or 
Discussion
297
Here we found that a higher explicit hope to gain power (h_Power; Schönbrodt & and the self-other beneficial factor, which was independent of the interaction of the self-other 
312
A previous study has found that behavioural approach sensitivity (BAS; Carver & Nonetheless, both non-significant main effects in our models pointed in the previously found 335 direction and might be covered up by low statistical power (i.e., having too few dilemmas).
336
The interaction between h_Power and the self-other beneficial factor indicates that 337 individuals with a higher explicit power motive have a tendency to shift their moral 338 perception in a way so that those solutions which are beneficial for themselves also appear to relates to people in power professions, as the power motive is particularly prevalent in these 367 professions (Jackson, 1974; Jenkins, 1994) and because their moral decisions can have a 368 major impact on other people's lives (e.g., when deciding whether or not to send soldiers to 369 war). For people in power professions but also for the general public it is important to be 370 aware of the factors which bias their own moral perception, since only then they can take conscious measures against them to attain a more balanced moral judgement. The hope to 372 gain power certainly is one of those moral biasing factors.
